 The share of immigrants among working age adults in the UK more than doubled between 1995 and 2014 -from 8% to 17% -and now stands at over 6.5 million.
Introduction
Immigration is a big issue. Twenty years of rising immigration mean that there are now around 7.8 million individuals (and 6.5 million adults of working age) living in the UK who were born abroad. This is a large, but not unprecedented, rise in the UK population. Between 1975 and 1990 , the UK working age population grew by around 200,000 a year, on average. This was driven not by immigration, but by a rise in the UK-born population. Between 1995 and 2014, the working age population also grew by around 200,000 a year, but the majority of this growth was due to immigration. Table 1 shows that 16.6% of the UK working age population are now immigrants, double the share in 1995. 
Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS)
The UK is not particularly different from many other rich countries in terms of its share of immigrants (see Figure 1 ). But opinion polling now puts it at the top of voters' concerns (Ipsos MORI, 2014) above the economy, unemployment, the NHS and crime (see Figure 2 ). The stock of immigrants depends on both the size of inflows and the duration of stay, which in turn is related to the number of outflows of emigrants. If more people arrive than leave, then the stock will rise. If people stay longer, then the stock will also rise. According to the International Passenger Survey (IPS), total annual inflows to the UK have been larger than outflows since 1993.
The UK government's target of reducing net migration (the difference between the number of people entering the UK and the number of people leaving) to tens of thousands by the end of the parliament requires either a fall in the numbers entering the UK or a rise in the numbers leaving the UK (or both). Net migration was at its highest, at around 250,000 a year, in 2004 , 2010 . 1 This means that the target has not been met.
When the data are split by citizenship (not country of birth), the IPS suggests that the number of UK citizens is falling by around 50,000 a year, but the net inflow of non-UK citizens has been growing -by around 250,000 a year since 1998. Immigration to the UK from the rest of the EU has recently grown as fast as immigration from outside the EU. At the same time, emigration from the UK has fallen back in recent years, making it harder to achieve a reduction in net migration. The stock of immigrants in the UK is influenced by both the country's relative economic performance and its immigration policy. Just as in Canada and Australia, the UK's immigration system has for some time restricted work-related immigration from outside the EU to (a varying subset of) skilled individuals. Study and family reunion are the other two main reasons for entry into the UK. In the 1990s, family reunion was the dominant entry route. Now student inflows are the main reason for entry, followed by those with a definite job offer, (see Figure  4 and Table A1 ). Student inflows have fallen significantly in the last few years. Most immigration from within the EU is for work-related reasons. Most immigration from outside the EU is for study-related reasons, (see Table A1 ). Table 2 shows the country of origin of the top five 'sender' countries in 1985 and 2014 for the stock of existing immigrants and the flow of new immigrants. Thirty years ago, 30% of all immigrants came from just two countries: Ireland and India. These two countries now account for just 13% of all immigrants. Today, Poland accounts for 9.4% of all new immigrants, closely followed by India. There are now nearly two million migrants from the EU resident in the UK. 
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What skills do immigrants have?
Immigrants are, on average, more educated than their UK-born counterparts, and the educational attainment gap has been rising over time (see Table 3 ). While just under half of the UK-born workforce left school at 16 or earlier, fewer than one in eight new immigrants did so. EU15 migrants are twice as likely to be graduates as the UK-born population. A8 migrants (those from the eight East European countries that joined the EU in 2004) are also more likely to be graduates than the UK-born, and most other A8 immigrants have intermediate levels of education. Source: LFS There is a larger than average share of immigrants than UK-born working in professional occupations (see Table 4 , last column). But there are also more immigrants than average in processing and elementary occupations (such as cleaning and bar work). This occupational mix in both high-skilled and less skilled jobs is reflected in the distribution of immigrants across industries (see Table 5 ). The health, hotel and restaurant sectors employ more migrant workers than other sectors, while the energy, agriculture and public administration sectors employ relatively fewer migrant workers. EU15 migrants are concentrated in the finance sector. In terms of age profile, immigrants are more likely to be in their twenties and thirties than the UK-born. Immigrants make up 37% (more than one in three) of London's population (see Figure 5 ). The geographical dispersion of immigrant share across local areas is much larger. Around 60% of the working age populations of Brent and Westminster were born overseas compared with less than 3% of the populations of Knowsley and Redcar & Cleveland. 
The labour market costs and benefits of immigration
Since immigration increases labour supply, it may be expected to reduce wages of the UKborn. UK immigrants are more skilled than those in the United States, so such pressure is more likely to reduce inequality as the wages of top jobs are likely to fall. But if labour demand rises, there may be no effects of immigration on wages and employment. An open economy may also adjust by means other than wages, such as changing the mix of goods and services produced.
If there is excess demand for labour in the receiving country, the impact of immigration will be different from that in a country already at full employment. Concerns about substitution and displacement of the UK-born workforce become more prevalent when output is demandconstrained, as in a recession or when capital is less mobile Empirical research on the labour market effects of immigration to the UK finds little overall adverse effects of immigration on wages and employment for the UK-born.
The empirical evidence shows that:
 Immigrants and native-born workers are not close substitutes on average (existing migrants are closer substitutes for new migrants). This means that UK-born workers are, on average, cushioned from rises in supply caused by immigration (Manacorda et al, 2011) .
 The less skilled are closer substitutes for immigrants than the more highly skilled. So any pressures from increased competition for jobs is more likely to be found among less skilled workers. But these effects are small (Manacorda et al, 2011; Dustmann et al, 2005 Dustmann et al, , 2013 Nickell and Saleheen, 2008) .
 There is no evidence that EU migrants affect the labour market performance of native-born workers (Lemos and Portes, 2008; Goujard et al, 2011) .
One concern with these findings is that they were based on data preceding the recession when demand was higher on average. To look at this more directly in recent years, we can examine whether immigration is associated with joblessness of the UK-born population across different geographical areas. If rising immigration crowds out the job prospects of UK-born workers, we might expect to see joblessness rise most in areas where immigration has risen most. While there appear to be no average effects, it may be that the average is concealing effects in the low wage labour market where (despite their higher relative education levels) many new immigrants tend to find work. Equally, there may also be a positive effect on wages in the high wage labour markets where it may take more time for the skills that immigrants bring to transfer.
But Figure 6 shows that there is no evidence of any association between changes in the less skilled (defined as those who left school at age 16) native youth NEET ('not in education, employment or training') rate and changes in the share of immigrants. Counties that experienced the largest rises in immigrants experienced neither larger nor smaller rises in native-born unemployment. 
Immigrants and new jobs
It is sometimes said that immigrants account for the majority of the new jobs generated. This is a misinterpretation of changes in aggregate jobs data. In times when the population is rising, the number of immigrants will grow alongside the numbers in employment. To look at who gets new jobs, we need to look at evidence on hiring. The actual immigrant share in new jobs (the share of immigrants in jobs that have lasted less than three months) is broadly the same as the share of immigrants in the working age population (see Figure 8 ). Therefore it is not the case that most new jobs are taken by immigrants.
Immigrants and other economic outcomes -public finances and public services
In terms of public finances, because immigrants are on average younger and in work, they tend to demand and use fewer public services and they are more likely to contribute tax revenue (Dustmann and Frattini, 2014) . This is particularly true with EU immigrants and also with recent arrivals from outside the EU. 
Source: LFS
The labour market is just one area in which rising immigration could have important effects, though there are many others, such as health (Wadsworth, 2013) , schools (Geay et al, 2013) , housing (Battiston et al, 2013; Sa, 2014) and crime (Bell et al, 2013) . We know much less about these issues than we do about the labour market, but there is a growing body of UK research evidence on these important issues.
Conclusions
On balance, the evidence on the UK labour market suggests that fears about adverse consequences of rising immigration regularly seen in opinion polls have not, on average, materialised. It is hard to find evidence of much displacement of UK workers or lower wages. Immigrants, especially in recent years, tend to be younger and better educated than the UKborn and less likely to be unemployed. So perceptions do not seem to line up with the existing evidence and it is perhaps here that we need to understand more.
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